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tively most useful and complete. It is almost superfluous to say that all contained
in them is stated with such clearness, and absence of technical phraseology as to
be readily understood and apprehended by the business men for whose use they
were written. Being made by "Mr. Bonney " they could not have been other-
wise.
As husband, father, friend, gentleman, and scholar, his life was not only above
reproach, but in him sweetness of disposition, gentleness of manner, consideration
for others were mingled with perfect integrity. He lived, worked, and wore him-
self out for others. His sympathies were world-wide. Of a profoundly religious
nature, he saw something of good in all men, and in all creeds. He loved man-
kind, worshipped God, bowed before human and divine law, toiled for the right,
and died with perfect faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and through him an eternity
of living conscious, intelligent, personal communion with the good who have been
and shall be. A. N. Waterman.
PROF. ERNST HAECKEL'S SOLUTION OF THE " WORLD
To the Editor of The Open Com-t:
The monism of Haeckel is the reductto ad absurdum of the idea of a God by
proving too much : or in other words. Pantheism = Atheism.
All that is said by theologians, and by ultra deniers, only strengthens the con-
viction of the present impossibility of accounting for the Cosmos. The unbiassed
man can agree with neither, as he can refute neither. He simply does not know.
and the more he learns, and the more he thinks, the stronger grows the justifica-
tion for his acknowledgment of ignorance.
He cannot deny the possibility of an anthropomorphic God, however crude
and unsatisfactory may be such an attempt to explain the cosmogony. On the
other hand, he stands aghast at the knowledge that person must assume to possess
who can say " There is no God." Both assumptions are irrational, but of the two
the assertion is a shade less irrational than the denial of the existence of a God-
Creator, for the reason that the asserter has the slender analogy of our microscopi-
cally finite experience to support the view that what is made must have a maker.
To the unprejudiced mind it appears impossible to reach conclusions concerning
the infinite from a very limited number of observed sequences in the (very small)
finite ; but the procedure offers at least a faint pretext (however insufficient) for
acceptance ; whereas the denier has nothing on which to base his tremendous de-
nial but his own inability to find what he denies; and his inability is infinite.
Of the two propositions representing the extremes of assertion and of negation
it may be said that it is ferhafs a shade less irrational to assert oti the strength
of an analogy of unkjioztm value, than to deny on the negative suffort of our
ozun failure to find
Accepting Haeckel's hypothesis, there is still ample room for even an anthro-
pomorphic God (however unlikely that may be) before the existence, or first thrill
of the "attenuated jelly" (protyle), and during the course of its evolution from
Moneran to Homo sapiens.
But with such a God the mystery of the cosmos is merely transferred to Him,
and is just as great as without Him, even if we knew accurately the phylogenetic
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chain from prototype to man, and the ontogenetic sequence from germination to
death.
Philadelphia, September, 1903. Persifor Frazer.
AGNOSTICISM.
IN REPLY TO MR. PERSIFOR FRAZER.
Mr. Persifor Frazer is an agnostic, and he takes the consequences of his doc-
trine of nescience. He claims that Haeckel's solution of the world-riddle breaks
down because he tries to prove too much. Mr. Frazer says that the unbiased man
can agree with neither the theologian nor the atheist ; "he can refute neither, he
simply does not know." According to these principles any theory concerning the
world-riddle (the constitution of the world, the nature of man's soul, and its fate
after death, etc.) is on the same footing whether it be the superstition of the sav-
age, or the mythology of Greece, or the dogma of some civilised religion, or the
private conviction of a naturalist, or even the assured conclusions of science. If
that be so, we had better give up all investigation and acquiesce in our ignorance
from which there is no hope of escape.
There are two kinds of agnosticism : one is the agnosticism of modesty ; the
other, absolute agnosticism. The former is a temporary suspension of judgment,
the latter a belief in perpetual nescience. The former is not agnosticism proper,
but is the natural attitude of a man who does not dogmatise on a subject which he
has not yet investigated. The latter is a declaration of bankruptcy, and it acts as
a blight on thought.
In our opinion, the problem of God, of soul, of ethics, or the destiny of man
and his duties in life,—in short, all the problems of philosophy, are not insolvable
problems, but admit of scientific investigation and solution. As to God, we believe
that we should first of all ask the question, not, whether or not does God exist, but
(i) What do we mean by God; (2) How did the God-idea historically originate ?
and (3) What are the underlying facts which suggested the God-idea? Having an-
swered these questions from the standpoint of an impartial investigator, we shall
be better fitted to attack the original question, whether or not God exists.
There is no need to enter here into a discussion of the subject. We have only
reluctantly yielded to Mr. Frazer's request of giving publicity to his note on
Haeckel and will repeat here what we have said again and again that among all
conceptions agnosticism is the most unsatisfactory, the most unscientific, and the
most unphilosophic.
Agnosticism is an important epoch in the history of philosophic thought, but
it is so inconsistent and untenable that even now it is fast dying out and will have
to be regarded by the historian merely as a phase of transition. p. c.
BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.
Lessons in the Study of Habits. For Use in the Grammar School, the Home,
or the Sunday School. By IValter L. Sheldon. Chicago : W. M. Welch
Company. Pages, 270.
The author is a lecturer of the Ethical Society at St. Louis, Mo., who has had
a great deal of experience in the instruction of ethics. It is a very diflScult sub-
ject, since the abstract teaching of ethics easily becomes wearisome to both the
teacher and the scholars, The present volume has to do with the habits of life, and
